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Abstract: Arguments intended to persuade have a chequered success record. Quite aside from failing to resolve deep 
disagreements, they are an inefficient means of persuasion in commerce and politics, and the persistence of competing 
schools of thought in numerous fields of scientific and scholarly theorizing despite argued advocacy also raises ques-
tions about arguing’s persuasive effectiveness. Yet humans are irredeemably reason-expecting and reason-giving crea-
tures. This paper offers some possible explanations of this paradoxical situation. 
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1. Introduction  
 
By an argument I mean a claim (positive or negative) about an assertion or a prescription (or pro-
scription) or commendation or condemnation, together with a set of considerations—grounds—
that are adduced, or alleged, or taken to support it. Arguments in this sense are what are used in 
episodes of arguing, and such episodes are also called “arguments.”1 I  will  try to be clear about 
which sense of ‘argument’ I am using at any given  time. 
 
 Here is Daniel O’Keefe on ‘persuasion’: 
 
These shared features of exemplary cases of persuasion can be strung together into some-
thing that looks like a definition of persuasion:  a successful intentional effort at influenc-
ing another’s mental state through communication in a circumstance in which the per-
suadee has some measure of freedom. But it should be apparent that constructing such a 
definition would not eliminate the fuzzy edges of the concept of persuasion. (O’Keefe 
2002, p. 5; my italics.) 
 
As O’Keefe’s definition makes clear, ‘persuasion’ is a “success” word. To persuade someone is to 
succeed in influencing them; and to be engaged in the activity of persuading someone is to be en 
route to succesfully influencing them. ‘Argument’ denotes either a kind of meaningful entity, or 
else an episode of a certain type of interactive communication. While to persuade is to accomplish 
ones’s goal, to argue is to participate without the assurance of realizing one’s objective. Can we 
agree, then, that persuasion and argument (in either sense) are different  concepts, even if  they 
overlap? Not all persuasion is by means of arguments. Nor, going by this definition of persuasion, 
are all arguments attempts to persuade, since some are used to do other things than attempt to 
influence another’s mental state. For instance, some are constructed to reassure oneself, others to 
 
1 See D.J. O’Keefe (1978, 1983) for the classic account of this distinction. 
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show that a decision has not been arbitrarily arrived at, others to indicate the reason one has for 
making a claim (see Aristotle, passim).  
 To be sure, one can stipulatively define ‘argument’ and ‘persuasion’ in such a way as to make 
them analytically connected—so that (as the song goes) you can’t have one without the other. One 
can stipulate any definitions one likes. That does not establish the meaning of the concept defined. 
It just entails that what can be correctly predicated of arguments in any theorizing based on that 
definition is limited in its applications to arguments so defined. 
 All that agreed to, in this paper I am interested in the use of arguments to attempt to persuade 
using evidence and other kinds of reasons. By the way, by using the word ‘reasons’ here I am not 
implying anything about whether there is a “faculty” of Reason or that “reason” is distinct from 
emotion (so that  reasons for claims cannot be such things as fear or pity.) I can easily imagine 
situations in which, for example, the  ethos of the arguer is a good reason for taking  what she  says 
to be true. Reasons, in my lexicography, are sets of premises; often two or more premises comprise 
one reason.2 My thesis, or to be more accurate, my hypothesis, is that arguments are, perhaps 
surprisingly, not  terribly effective as a means of persuasion. By “ the use of argument” I mean the 
appeal  to  reasons that one alleges support a contention to gain the assent of one’s  target audience 
to that contention. This is an empirical claim. Its truth or falsehood is to be established by appeal 
to the facts revealed by observation and experience. 
 Before setting out evidence for the hypothesis, let me acknowledge at the outset that there are 
many, many cases in which arguments are used successfully as means of persuasion. 
 For instance, judges and juries are regularly persuaded by the arguments of advocates in plead-
ings in court that a particular judgement is the correct one in the circumstances. Even if you grant 
that judges and juries can be influenced by irrelevant factors, the testimony and evidence presented 
in court is recorded and kept, and it is expected to be what justify the rulings issued by the judge. 
 In the social sciences, where the evidence gathered and the methodology used in a study con-
stitute the premises of an argument, and the findings appropriately qualified, its conclusion, fellow 
scientists will often be persuaded by the arguments. The evidence is the great extent to which 
social scientific claims are based on the citations of others’ research. 
 Moreover, in daily life we are as likely as not to be persuaded by arguments, both concerning 
what to do and what to accept (or to believe), from our intimates, our friends and our trusted col-
leagues. Everyone can provide examples. “There’s a conference reception tonight.  Hans Hansen 
told me, and he [as the conference organizer] should know!” 
 So, I do not mean to imply by my title that arguments are never persuasive.  On the other 
hand, I do think that the ineffectiveness of arguments is not limited to the failed attempts to 
use them to resolve deep disagreements. (See Fogelin 1985 for the locus classicus on the topic 
of deep disagreements.) I will set those cases aside. There remain interesting situations in 
which the use of arguments to try to persuade is problematic. In the next section I will describe 
some of these. Following that I will venture some speculation as to why they are not effective, 
when they are not. The paper ends with an attempt to account for why we persist in arguing 
even when it seems quite predictable that we will not succeed in persuading. 
 
 
2.  Arguments can be a poor means of persuasion 
 
2 E.g. of an argument with two premises and one reason: “My client isn’t the murderer, for it’s been established that 
the murderer was right-handed and my client is left-handed.” = [C: My client isn’t the murderer. P1: the murderer 
was right-handed, P2: my client is left-handed.] 
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Several examples are available to support the hypothesis. I will discuss the use of arguments to 
persuade in advertising, political campaigns, scholarly disputes, and religious conversion.  
 
2.1  The case of advertising 
 
The evidence that arguments are not a successful means of persuasion in advertising is the fact that 
advertisers do not rely on them to sell products and services. Companies spend a lot of money on 
advertising, so they want their advertising to be effective. Before launching a national advertising 
campaign, ad agencies will test their commercials in small market segments. The testing of com-
mercials and ad campaigns has become a science.3  
 So, the TV commercials we see have been crafted and tested for their effectiveness in achiev-
ing their objectives. And the objectives of advertising can be many—one website lists 11 different 
possible objectives of ads.4 The point is that if arguments were the most effective way of achieving 
their objectives, commercials would consist of arguments, but commercials frequently do not con-
sist of arguments (Wrighter), and a case might be made that the most effective advertisements in 
achieving their objectives do not employ arguments. For instance “Coke is it”, “Share a Coke” 
(Coca Cola), “Just do it” (Nike), “Think small” (Volkswagen  Beetle), “Absolut New York” 
(Vodka)—all hugely effective ad campaigns, but—“Where’s the beef?”—none of them is an ar-
gument. 
 When I have made this point in the past, I have frequently encountered the objection that ads 
are by definition arguments, for they are attempts to persuade by giving reasons.  We need to clear 
away the obviously fallacious form of the objection, which runs as follows: 
 
 Sellers rely on various means of attempted persuasion. 
 Arguments are attempts at persuasion. 
 Hence, sellers rely on arguments. 
 
 This argument has the same form as the following obviously invalid argument. 
 
 Vegetarians eat various kinds of nutritious food. 
 Meat is a kind of nutritious food. 
 Hence vegetarians eat meat. 
 
The valid form of the objection runs as follows: 
 
 Sellers rely on various means of attempted persuasion. 
 Attempts at persuasion are arguments. 
 Hence, sellers rely on arguments. 
 
 
3 See http://www.dobney.com/Research/ad_testing.htm, accessed  9 February 2020. 
4 Introduce a product, introduce a brand, awareness creation, acquire customers, differentiation, brand building, posi-
tioning, increase sales, increase profits, create desire, call to action. (https://www.marketing91.com/objectives-of-
advertising, accessed 9 February 2020) 
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The second premise is vague: does it refer to all attempts at persuasion or just to some? Are all 
attempts at persuasion arguments? The contention that they are contradicts the assumption to 
which I sought your agreement at the outset of the paper.  Consider the following counterexamples. 
 
1. Although you excuse yourself from dessert because of your diet, someone attempts to persuade 
you to have some dessert anyway by giving you a teaspoon of it to taste. 
2. Someone attempts to persuade others that they are wealthy by renting an expensive car and 
pretending that they own it. 
3. Someone attempts to persuade you to think they like hockey by talking knowledgeably about 
the games. 
4. One country attempts to persuade another to accept its exports by threatening a tariff war if it 
doesn’t. 
5. Someone attempts to persuade you that they like you by treating you with affection. 
6. You walk past a bakery and the scent of freshly baked bread wafts out a window, left open 
deliberately to attempt to persuade passersby to come in and make a purchase. 
 
These are all attempts to cause a commitment, belief or action by means other than presenting 
considerations directly inviting the persuadee to accept the conclusion because they accept the 
premise and they believe the premise supports the conclusion.  
 The case of advertising is complicated by the fact that sometimes commercials include argu-
ments so as to appear to appeal to the customer’s reason. However, they also include such compo-
nents as handsome or beautiful actors, cute children, cute animals, lovely landscape, expensive-
looking houses and cars, and various other devices that in the context offer no reason  to like or 
purchase the product, but appeal to the consumer’s self-image or aspirational identity. Such ap-
peals tend to be far more powerful persuasive devices than attempts to persuade using reasons. If 
the text alone were enough to persuade, why would commercials include all these expensive props? 
 I do not mean to suggest that the non-verbal elements in advertisements cannot be arguments. 
My point is not at all that there cannot be visual or other non-verbal arguments; in fact, I have 
argued that there can be (see Blair 1996, 2004). Moreover, some purely visual advertisements are 
good examples of arguments. Nor do I mean to suggest that the emotional appeals cannot be ra-
tional. Appeals to fear, or to  pity, for instance, on the contrary, can constitute reasonable argu-
ments, and be used as such in commercials, although at the same time there can also be irrational 
pity and fear, and commercials that conjure up false fears or use pity to advance bogus causes, are 
not rational appeals to emotions. But granting all of these concessions, I nonetheless contend that 
there remain commercials that succeed by arousing unconscious feelings of empathy, or by invok-
ing deeply seated human motivations such as our self-images.  We can like a commercial because 
it  is clever, amusing, or sexy and have that attitude transfer to the brand without our realising  it. 
And when  such commercials  are overlain with verbal arguments, we can deceive ourselves in 
thinking we are persuaded by the arguments. 
 To be sure, if one defines argument so that any attempt to persuade by any means counts as 
an argument, then the above examples would then not serve as counterexamples However, it would 
then be necessary to distinguish two types of arguments: those intended to persuade by appealing 
to good reasons, and those intended to persuade by using other means. This paper is about the 
former. 
 
2.2  The case of political argument 
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Politics, one would think, would be a natural home of arguments used to persuade. After all, it is 
the forum in which policies are debated, and debate consists of the exchange of arguments. It has 
to be recognized that arguments thrive in the habitat of politics. Even so, the most influential na-
tional political campaigns are driven by personalities more than by arguments over policies. A 
nationally elected president or a party leader and aspiring prime minister represents a vision, an 
aspiration, an ideal, a personality (or some combination of these) for the country, which cannot be 
parsed as an argument. 
 “Make America great again” was obviously a successful slogan. What does it mean? One can 
create arguments that are possible interpretations, but none of them captures the strong feelings 
that the slogan tapped into: the fear and hopelessness of having lost a comfortable and secure way 
of life, with no prospects; the yearning for a return to job security; the anxiety about the future; the 
longing for the reassurance provided by the brief period after the breakup of the USSR when 
American was the unchallenged most powerful nation in the world, and more. 
 In legislative debates, it is true that the specific policies of each party are argued for; but the 
arguments rarely convince the other parties to support legislative proposals. If a compromise is 
hammered out, it usually due to horse-trading rather than to conceding the merits of the arguments 
supporting it. 
 
2.3  The case of scholarly disagreements 
 
One might have thought that at least among scholars, arguments would be effective means of per-
suading colleagues of a thesis or a point of view, and yet in academic scholarship differing schools 
of thought continue to emerge and to be maintained. Think of the different theoretical positions 
that are kept alive in psychology and in philosophy. Within Western philosophy, besides broad 
differences in methodology between analytic and continental philosophy, within each branch of 
philosophy such as ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, there are contending schools of thought 
whose differences resist the force of vigorously contending arguments. Although possibly some 
of these differences are due to so-called “deep disagreements”, many are disputes over fine-grained 
details within a shared theoretical perspective. 
 
2.4  The case of religious differences 
 
The differences between Islam, Judaism and Christianity for example, might with reason be clas-
sified as due to deep disagreements, but the differences within each “faith” are less plausibly so 
characterized. The plethora of Protestant sects is a case in point. Yet rarely, it seems, are arguments 
even tried in defence of one sect over and against the others. The Watchtower magazine sponsored 
by Seventh-Day Adventists stands out as a striking exception. 
  
These four examples constitute evidence supporting the hypothesis I am defending, namely, that 
arguments are surprisingly ineffective in persuading people to adopt beliefs and other attitudes or 
to endorse actions or policies. Why is that so? That is the next question. 
 
 
3.  Why are arguments ineffective at rational persuasion? 
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Here are two speculations about what causes arguments to be ineffective. 
 
3.1 Relative effectiveness 
 
In some situations, although arguments might persuade, other means of persuasion are more effec-
tive. I have already expanded on advertising as case in point.  Here is another example. It is far 
more likely to persuade someone to be a follower of a religious sect to have that person as a child 
raised by a family who believe that it is the one true version of the religion, to educate the child in 
a school system that constantly reminds the child of the truth of that sect’s beliefs, and to have the 
child pass through a series of rituals marking his or her acceptance into full adult membership in 
the sect—it is far more likely to persuade someone to identify with a particular sect in these ways 
than it is to approach the person as an adult who does not adhere to the sect in question and present 
arguments for joining it. In such situations, to attempt to persuade a person to adopt a competing 
belief or attitude runs up against a firewall that is extraordinarily effective. 
 
3.2 Cognitive costs 
 
Then there is the cognitive expenditure involved in being open to persuasion by argument. Just 
think of what being persuaded by an argument entails! 
 First, you have to understand and accept the argument’s premises. For that to happen, you 
might have to accept other arguments first, namely those that support the premises of the argument 
in question that you might otherwise find problematic. You have to trust the source of the premises 
to be accurate, knowledgeable, and truthful. The premises have to cohere with your other beliefs. 
They might compete, or appear to compete, with other claims and these tensions have to be re-
solved.  
 Second, you have to believe that the premises support the conclusion of the argument. You 
can’t believe that there are facts or plausible considerations consistent with the premises but in-
compatible with the conclusion. You might need to be satisfied that the inference from the prem-
ises to the conclusion is appropriately hedged by qualifiers such as “probably”, or “for the most 
part,” or “in the circumstances”—and so on.   
 Third, you mustn’t firmly disbelieve the conclusion at the outset. If that condition were not 
met, then no matter how convincing you find the argument, you might, reasonably, withhold your 
assent to it. For instance, suppose  someone told  you that a  bull moose with a huge rack of antlers 
was seen this morning in early June wandering the streets of Windsor, and in reply to your expres-
sion of doubt, said it was reported on the news and confirmed by several citizens who witnessed 
it. Suppose further that you know that moose habitat in Canada is in the forests hundreds of kilo-
metres north of the farmland of southern Ontario where Windsor is located, and, moreover, that 
moose shed their antlers in late winter or early spring and have not fully grown new ones until late 
August. You would not be convinced by the argument. It is notoriously hard to convince someone 
who is invested in contrary views.  
 Fourth, you cannot believe that there is a more convincing argument for some position that is 
contrary to the conclusion.  
 Fifth, you cannot harbour such doubts about the argument as that it is too neat and simple not 
to harbour trickery, or that it is too complicated for you to understand and assess.  
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 Sixth, and perhaps most important, you have to trust argument as in principle a reliable a 
conveyor of truth or acceptability; you won’t be persuaded by an argument if you are wary of 
reason-giving. 
 In sum, for an argument—any argument—to win a person over, there is a set of fairly high 
fences to be cleared. That can require a big expenditure of cognitive resources and energy. Given 
these conditions, it is to be expected that arguments are much more effective in reinforcing existing 
beliefs and other attitudes than in changing them or introducing new ones. The latter can entail 
shifting and restructuring attitude and belief systems—and these aren’t necessarily worldview-
deep considerations (an example would be changing loyalties from the Leafs to the Red Wings).5 
So, arguments directed at persuading someone to alter their beliefs or change their behaviour can 
be a major imposition, one that people understandably resist. It is far less cognitively taxing to 
read newspapers and newsmagazines, and watch TV stations whose political and social views one 
shares than to make the effort to expose oneself to a broad range of sources. For understandable 
reasons, then, arguments that challenge comfortable views are unlikely to be given a careful hear-
ing, let alone be greeted by an open mind. 
 
 
4: Why do we argue anyway? 
 
A striking thing about using arguments to try to persuade is that we continue to do so even when 
the conditions for success are absent; even when we have no reasonable expectation of persuading 
our audience. One perfectly reasonable explanation is that we tend not to be aware of the conditions 
required for successful attempts to persuade using arguments, and it seems likely that we some-
times do argue to try to persuade when it is futile to do so and we ought to know better.  
 But this assumes that when we use arguments in circumstances in which we have bleak pro-
spects of persuading those we address it is always our intent to use reasons to try to persuade them 
of the truth or acceptability of the argument’s conclusion. There is reason to question that assump-
tion, for there are equally or more plausible explanations of why we produce arguments in those 
situations in which successful persuasion is not a good prospect. I mentioned three of these at 
beginning of the paper. 
 
1. Some arguments are constructed to reassure oneself.  
2. Others show that a decision has not been arbitrarily arrived at. 
3. Others indicate the reason one has for making the claim.  
 
I will say a few words about each of these in turn. 
 1. When you make assertions to others describing or explaining something, in situations in 
which you expect to be challenged, or even just questioned, you want to have confidence in their 
truth or acceptability—their reasonableness. Thus, it is natural in such cases to make explicit to 
yourself or rehearse the grounds that justify such assertions in your own mind. In expressing these 
grounds, you are offering an explanation why you think the assertions are sound, and of course 
they constitute arguments for them. This might be termed the reassuring use of arguments. 
 2. In law, it is customary, if not obligatory, for judges to write up their reasons for their deci-
sions.  (At a certain level, initial drafts might be prepared by law clerks.) These are often written 
 
5 The Toronto Maple Leafs and the Detroit Red Wings are historical archrivals in the National Hockey League in 
North America. Leafs fans who move to Detroit and Red Wings fans who move to Toronto can feel like aliens. 
  8 
after their ruling, and as such can be functioning as rationales for decisions originally based on 
experience or legal instinct, or on the persuasive arguments made by counsel in court. The re-
quirement to write a rationale for a decision in court cases or tribunal hearings creates the burden 
of having to have a justification for the decision, thereby making for less arbitrariness in the de-
cision making. These reasons for rulings, in the case of legal argumentation, are not arguments 
intended to persuade. They can provide grounds for appeals and they might serve to guide judge-
ments in future cases, but since they appear after the fact of the trial or hearing to which they re-
fer they have no persuasive role in influencing the cases that give rise to them. This might be 
termed the rationale use of arguments.    
 3. For a third use of arguments, consider the following famous paragraph from the Ni-
comachean Ethics: 
 
Now such a thing [that which is complete without qualification…. {namely} that which 
is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else] happiness is held to 
be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but 
honour, pleasure, reason, and every excellence we choose indeed for themselves (for if 
nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them),  but we  choose them 
also for  the sake of happiness, judging  that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, 
on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general for anything other 
than itself. (1097a35 – 1097b7) 
 
In this short paragraph, Aristotle offers (1) a reason why happiness is considered complete without 
qualification (“Now such a thing happiness is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and 
never for the sake of something else”); (2) a reason why happiness alone among the virtues is 
always chosen for itself and never for the sake of anything else (“Happiness, on the other hand, no 
one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general for anything other than itself.”); (3) the evidence 
showing that we choose every excellence or virtue for itself (“honour, pleasure, reason, and every 
excellence we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still 
choose each of them)”) ; and (4) the reason why we choose the other virtues for the sake of happi-
ness (“but we  choose them [honour, pleasure, reason] also for  the sake of happiness, judging  that 
through them we shall be happy”).  That’s four arguments in an 88-word paragraph. 
 In many of his works, Aristotle seems to have given a reason for nearly every second assertion. 
Each assertion-supported-by-a-reason is an argument. Was Aristotle giving arguments to per-
suade? No doubt occasionally he was, for instance when he was taking issue with Platonic doc-
trines. For the most part, however, it is implausible to think he was anticipating doubt about or 
disbelief of every second sentence he wrote. My guess is that a case could be made for taking 
Aristotle’s arguments to perform many functions, including—as we have just seen in the passage 
from the Nicomachean Ethics—explaining his claims and justifying them.  In other words, he was 
setting out his reasoning as he wrote. I would call this the explaining one’s reasoning use of argu-
ments. I submit that Aristotle is not unique in setting out his reasoning as he wrote, and that is not 
just because others were copying his style. 
 In short, there are other functions for which we use arguments that do not presuppose that in 
doing so we are trying to persuade our audiences to accept our claims, using reasons. This position 
has been defended by numerous scholars in the speech communication community, where it has 
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long been recognized.6  Goodwin (2007) has gone so far as to say that argument does not have a 
function, and although she is talking about arguing rather than arguments, I take her to mean that 
arguments can be used in arguings designed to serve any number of quite different purposes. It 
turns out to be hardly surprising that arguments abound in situations in which using them to try to 
persuade is inappropriate. The diversity of uses of arguments helps to explain their only partial 
intersection with persuasion. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
I have argued that arguments are not persuasive in many situations when we nonetheless use them. 
Their ineffectiveness as a means of persuasion in such situations can be understandable, given that 
there can be much more effective means of persuasion available and also given the major cognitive 
investment that persuasion requires of the persuadee. But so too can our persistence in giving 
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